The above facts can be obscured by the fact that when we talk about rights, we are often talking about complex aggregates of rights that include rights of law, freedoms, powers or immunities. (Judith Thomson suggests that these aggregates are rights themselves, rights that contain other rights, or “bundled rights”.15.) For example, when we talk about Smith`s ownership rights in his car, we mean a set of rights that include both Smith`s rights of claim against others who do not interfere with his continued possession and use of that car, and Smith`s powers to transfer (or dispose of) his rights in that car. And when we talk about a right to self-defense, we often mean a set of rights that include both a qualified freedom to do certain things that are normally prohibited (e.g. Use force) to defend themselves, as well as a right to claim against others that they do not interfere with the exercise of this freedom. When we say that someone is “free” to do something or has “freedom” to do something, we often mean not only that they have the freedom to do it (i.e., they have no obligation not to do it), but also that others have an obligation not to interfere with them. For these and other reasons, a theory of rights will not be a complete moral theory. And knowing what the rights of the parties involved are is not enough to know what to do or not to do. Note that not all duties or obligations include the corresponding rights. Thus, if the absence of obligation leads to the absence of a right of complaint, the absence of a right of complaint does not mean the absence of obligation or obligation.
East Asia is the region of the world that participates least in the international human rights system – although some major East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea participate. In the 1990s, Singapore`s Chief Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and others argued that international human rights, as enshrined in United Nations declarations and treaties, were insensitive to distinctive “Asian values” such as family and community building (as opposed to strong individualism); placing social harmony above personal freedom; respect for political leaders and institutions; and the emphasis on responsibility, hard work and saving as a means of social progress (on the Asian debate on values, see Bauer and Bell 1999; Bell 2000; Sen, 1997; and Twining, 2009). Supporters of Asian values do not want to abolish all human rights; Rather, they wanted to devalue certain families of human rights, especially the fundamental rights and freedoms of democratic participation (and in some cases women`s rights). They also wanted Western governments and NGOs to stop criticizing them for human rights violations in these regions. The idea of natural rights is also closely linked to that of human rights; Some recognize no difference between the two, while others choose to keep the terms separate to eliminate the link with certain characteristics traditionally associated with natural rights. In particular, natural rights are considered not to be within the authority of a government or international body for rejection. The Catholic Church regards natural law as a dogma. The Church considers that “the natural law expresses the original moral sense that enables man to distinguish by reason between good and evil, truth and falsehood: “The natural law is written and engraved in the soul of every human being, because it is human reason that calls him to do good and forbid him to sin. But this commandment of human reason would have no force of law if it were not the voice and interpreter of a higher reason to which our mind and freedom must be subjected.  Natural law, for the Catholic Church, consists of a supreme and universal principle from which all our natural moral obligations or duties flow.
Thomas Aquinas summarizes the various ideas of Catholic moral thinkers about what this principle is: Since good is primarily an understanding of practical reason, the highest principle of moral action must have good as its central idea, and therefore the supreme principle is that good must be done and evil avoided.  Griffin`s argument that all human rights are based on normative action is presented not so much as a description as a proposal, as the best way to give human rights unity, coherence and limits. Unfortunately, the adoption and implementation of this proposal is unlikely to result in any effective obstacles to dissemination or a clear line between human rights and other moral norms. The main reason is what Griffin himself acknowledges: the “generative capacities” of the normative agency are “quite large.” Adequate protection of the three components of normative capacity (autonomy, freedom and minimum welfare) will face many threats to these values and will therefore require many rights. Rawls says human rights are a special class of urgent rights. It seems to accept the definition of human rights contained in section 1 above. In addition to declaring human rights to be high priority or “urgent” rights, Rawls also accepts that they are plural and universal. But Rawls worked on a narrower project than Gewirth and Griffin. The international human rights with which he has dealt are also defined by their role in defining the normative structure of the global system in various ways. They provide content to other normative concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty, authorized intervention and membership in the international community. Perhaps the debate on relativism and human rights has become obsolete.